Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2006 China’s Engagement in Africa scope significance and consequences - § 9 references coded [ 2.64% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.70% Coverage

Since many African leaders were themselves at the time under growing domestic and external pressure to liberalise their political systems, they were more than willing to go along with China’s claims that Western demands for democracy and the respect for human rights amounted to thinly veiled imperialistic manoeuvres intent on interfering in the domestic politics of developing states and undermining their stability and progress at large. Gauging the relations between developing and developed states in terms of a North–South conﬂict, this discourse served as a powerful glue whereby China sought to construct a common identity with African states vis-a`-vis the paternalistic West. With these considerations in mind, China moved swiftly to increase its assistance to developing countries substantially, most of which were African nations

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

Although an emerging economic superpower, China continues to   
portray itself as a developing nation, at least to African audiences, to underline the quasi-natural convergence of interests between,

Reference 3 - 0.15% Coverage

Although this represents a large amount when As   
measured against China’s GDP per capita ($911 in 2002), the country clearly lags behind the volumes disbursed by major Western nations

Reference 4 - 0.27% Coverage

it is far from clear whether China is prepared to become a dedicated donor nation, with the obligations and commitments this may entail, or whether it will continue to emphasise its own status as a developing country, deﬁning whatever it deems to be ‘within its power’ and thus forgoing international agreements among donors.

Reference 5 - 0.19% Coverage

Ofthe wide range ofChinese activities in Africa, economic transactions   
provide the most powerful evidence of China’s increasing interests in the continent. The skyrocketing of Chinese–African trade deserves particular emphasis.

Reference 6 - 0.15% Coverage

China’s donor policies reﬂect this state-centred orthodoxy to the degree that, the issue of Taiwan aside, no political conditions are attached to its development assistance

Reference 7 - 0.29% Coverage

Such observations underline that non-intrusive China presents an attractive partner for African governments; that is, not only for plainly authoritarian leaders, but also for the great many African governments presiding over hybrid regimes for whom the distribution of patronage remains an exigency of political survival (see van de Walle 2001).

Reference 8 - 0.45% Coverage

No less important, they conceptualise emergent South–South relations as a historical opportunity for Africa’s states to escape the neo-colonial ties to the West. And yet, it is not evident that Chinese–African trade diﬀers signiﬁcantly from Western– African trade patterns; nor is it clear that China’s engagement will substantially improve Africa’s prospects for development (see Goldstein et al. 2006). Judging from its most important import partners, Beijing’s economic interests in Africa do not vary from those ofWestern states.

Reference 9 - 0.27% Coverage

China’s interests supersede vague discourses on ‘South–South’ solidarity is also a lesson learned by South Africa. Complaining that cheap Chinese textile imports threaten to annihilate local industries, South African trade unions exhorted the Pretoria government to have recourse to the WTO to protect textile industries.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2007 China and Africa- Building a Strategic Partnership - § 6 references coded [ 1.47% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.24% Coverage

The People’s Republic of China’s original Africa policy was largely based on ideological and strategic considerations. It tried to project an image of being a fellow member of the Third World and a protagonist of SouthSouth cooperation, and it claimed that it would combat colonialism, imperialism, and superpower inﬂ uence on the continent.

Reference 2 - 0.40% Coverage

Loans were to be non-conditional, interestfree, with repayment easily rescheduled, and projects would be designed to make the recipient self-reliant rather than dependent on China. To do this, the Chinese promised to select income-generating projects that could be constructed rapidly. Finally, China pledged to provide countries with top-quality Chinese equipment and materials at international prices, and experts who would transfer their technical knowledge fully and would live among their local counterparts (Bräutigam, 1998: 43; Akindele, 1985).

Reference 3 - 0.19% Coverage

Though Chinese ofﬁ cials continued to pay rhetorical lip service to such issues as South-South cooperation, the reality of the situation was that Beijing was mainly interested in maintaining good relations with countries from which it could beneﬁ t economically.

Reference 4 - 0.14% Coverage

China’s aid has become particularly attractive to African leaders, precisely because it comes with no conditionality on governance, ﬁ scal probity, and the other concerns of western donors.

Reference 5 - 0.26% Coverage

At the same time, Beijing restructured its foreign aid programme, shifting from interest-free loans to guaranteed discounted loans offered through Chinese banks and aimed at building up trade, investment and joint ventures in Africa. Whether this linkage of aid to the construction of joint ventures with Chinese ﬁ rms amounts to conditionalities is a moot point

Reference 6 - 0.26% Coverage

Moreover, they are willing to offer what is referred to as a ‘total package’: cash, soft loans, investments, bribes, technology, the construction of infrastructure and prestige objects, arms sales, political protection from international pressures, using China’s seat on the UN Security Council and other incentives to bolster their competitive advantage.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2008 Giles Mohan New African Choices The Politics of Chinese Engagement - § 7 references coded [ 1.70% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.23% Coverage

whilst Chinese ‘aid’ is used to further geopolitical claims it has been different from western approaches, by being based on bilateral ‘co-operation’ rather than a moralising political discourse of ‘catch up’ development, and seeking to minimise the social differences between giver and receiver, though not always successfully.

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

Zhou Enlai foreshadowed the concept of ‘South-South’ co-operation in his African tour of 1963-4 in advocating mutual economic assistance between ‘poor friends’ and in attacking the bullying of small and weak countries by the ‘big and strong’ (Snow, 1995)

Reference 3 - 0.17% Coverage

Beijing has also argued that China and Africa are both cradles of civilisation, that both ‘belong to the developing world’ and face common enemies and as a result they have common strategic interests and a shared perspective on major international issues

Reference 4 - 0.14% Coverage

Beijing has also suggested that as a result China and Africa should support each other in close co-operation on key global issues and has sought to mobilise and maintain African support on those issues.

Reference 5 - 0.32% Coverage

Some authors (Melville and Owen, 2005; Alden, 2005b; Carroll, 2006; Marks, 2006) are sceptical about China’s interest in Africa as a form of ‘South-South cooperation’, which is more progressive and less selfish, suggesting it might be the more familiar and hegemonic ‘North-South relationship’ with China attempting to oppose unilateral global dominance in part by building relationships that bolster Beijing’s diplomatic offensive against ‘hegemonism’.

Reference 6 - 0.25% Coverage

Two key historical moments also stand out here – the Asian-African Conference that met in Bandung in April 1955 and the establishment of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) which held its first conference in 1957. More broadly, the roots of this engagement are to be found in the wider climate of ‘third worldism’ and the NonAligned Movement

Reference 7 - 0.43% Coverage

While this posits a more co-operative stance by China vis-à-vis the developing world based on ‘peaceful coexistence’, there is much to suggest that China’s renewed interests in Africa is not much different from those of the neo-liberal ‘Western’ powers, namely to advance the class power of its elites (Harvey, 2005). Hence, while China’s rhetoric of non-aligned, socialist ‘brotherhood’ remains its geo-strategic interests have changed dramatically. Therefore, the question remains whether China’s engagement with Africa will radically alter the ‘extraverted’ relationship to the global economy (Sautman, 2006).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2009 Chinas diplomacy toward Africa drivers and constraints1[retrieved\_2020-09-21] - § 1 reference coded [ 0.03% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.03% Coverage

aid programs ‘with no strings attached’.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2009 The Past in the Present Historical and Rhetorical Lineage in China’s Relations with Africa - § 3 references coded [ 2.03% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.98% Coverage

First is that China is untainted by a history of colonization in Africa, in at least implicit comparison to the West. Second is the perception that China is uniquely   
780 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 777–795   
suited to assist Africa from a position of analogous but separate history of anti-colonial struggle, underdevelopment and representing “old splendid civilizations.” Third are the repeated initiatives to assist Africa in a spirit of co-equal friendship that emphasizes China’s own developmental experience, leading to eventual African self-reliance rather than perpetual superior–inferior tutelage and dependency. Fourth is China’s absolute insistence on the principle of strict non-interference in domestic affairs while upholding norms of state sovereignty. Linked with this is a reiteration of China’s superior moral constancy as an “allweather friend,” implicitly unlike the West, which constantly changes its colours and demands on Africa in terms of accountability, transparency, structural adjustment and so on. Finally, all of the above are reinforced by the sheer repetition of particular historical episodes that supports these points.

Reference 2 - 0.78% Coverage

For decades, China has claimed to be a poor and developing country, and its presumptive developmental successes, both in the revolutionary Mao years and in the present, illustrate a range of possible ways forward for Africa. Having suffered an analogous history ofunderdevelopment and colonialism, China positions itself as uniquely situated to help Africa on the basis of mutual benefit, non-conditionality and demonstration by example. Taken in aggregate this is a heady and convincing package, one that resonates with much older Chinese notions of statecraft as didactic morality and softens contemporary anxieties about place in the world, thus allowing China to claim to be both old and new, separate and better, national and international. In short, key elements of the rhetoric continue to be very attractive to a range of audiences within China itself, particularly against a backdrop of increasingly voiced nationalism from below.

Reference 3 - 0.26% Coverage

Unlike the changeable West, which promotes a range of different rhetorics to jus-   
tify radical changes in policy direction roughly every decade, the consistency of China’s rhetoric on Africa makes it possible for it to make a credible claim to be Africa’s “all-weather friend” andappealbroadly to Africanelites.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 BuildingcComplementarities in Africa between Different - § 2 references coded [ 0.38% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

DA from China to Africa is relatively limited and includes a wide range of activities such as providing grants, scholarships,   
construction of infrastructure projects, etc

Reference 2 - 0.24% Coverage

the issue of debt sustainability and loans provided by China EXIM-Bank. In this regard it is important to highlight that China EXIM-Bank takes debt sustainability into account when making loans, but that is not necessarily the same as development sustainability (Li, 2007).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 Samy China’s Aid Policies in Africa Opportunities and - § 7 references coded [ 1.74% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

It is important to emphasise that aid is just one part of the broader foreign policy objectives and that it is diﬃcult in the case of China to separate the eﬀects of aid from other forms of co-operation.

Reference 2 - 0.22% Coverage

For example, the package of incentives oﬀered by the Chinese government during the Beijing Summit of 2006 included not only aid (grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans and debt relief), but also trade and investment measures.

Reference 3 - 0.37% Coverage

China’s African Policy Paper (2006) discusses diﬀerent avenues for co-operation, namely political, economic, educational, scientiﬁc, cultural and administrative, to name a few; the word ‘aid’ appears only under the heading of ‘humanitarian assistance’ so that it is diﬃcult to   
China’s Aid Policies in Africa 81   
know how much of these diﬀerent forms of co-operation could be considered as ODA

Reference 4 - 0.23% Coverage

It is not clear how close the deﬁnition of aid used by the Chinese authorities is to the ODA numbers reported by the DAC, other than they are supposed to follow the guiding principles proposed by former Prime Minister Zhou Enlai discussed earlier.

Reference 5 - 0.19% Coverage

Interestingly, the principles allow for both grants and concessional loans to be provided (principle 3), but in practice most aid is currently distributed at concessional rates with strings attached.

Reference 6 - 0.21% Coverage

One possible reason for prioritising concessional loans by the Chinese could be to encourage African countries to become more responsible and self-reliant (principle 4) because they have to pay back some of the loans

Reference 7 - 0.33% Coverage

The policy of non-interference could also mean that Chinese aid is not as selective   
as aid by the traditional donors and this can be especially problematic in countries such as Angola, Sudan or Zimbabwe where governments have a reputation of being corrupt and non-accountable, thus raising concerns that the sums received might not be wisely spent.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2011 Bräutigam Aid ‘With Chinese Characteristics’ Chinese Foreig - § 11 references coded [ 4.16% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.24% Coverage

The reason why this is so is because the lion’s share of China’sofﬁcially supported activities in other developing countries do not take the form of, and would not qualify as, ofﬁcial development assistance.

Reference 2 - 0.34% Coverage

China’s external assistance is also deﬁned by its concessionality and includes grants, zerointerest loans and ‘concessional’ (low, ﬁxed interest) loans. China’s foreign aid grants and zero‐interest loans are managed by the Ministry of Commerce and usually promote broad diplomacy objectives

Reference 3 - 1.09% Coverage

China Eximbank’s description of its concessional loan programme emphasises the ways   
in which they parallel the ODA deﬁnition. The concessional loans are ‘extended by the China Eximbank under the designation of the Chinese government, to the government of the borrowing country with the nature of ofﬁcial assistance’ [i.e. ODA]. The objective of these loans is to ‘promote economic development and improve living standards in developing countries,’ and to ‘boost economic cooperation between developing countries and China.’ Projects need to have ‘good social beneﬁts’. China Eximbank also offers preferential export credits, which are managed directly by the Eximbank and are not considered ‘ofﬁcial assistance’ (China Eximbank, 2009b). Although the entire face value of grants and zero‐interest loans is counted as aid and   
charged to China’s external assistance budget, the concessional loans from China Eximbank are treated differently.

Reference 4 - 0.27% Coverage

China’sofﬁcial aid is a subset of the many kinds of ofﬁcial ﬁnance offered by the   
Chinese government, some of which ﬁnance other economic activities carried out overseas by Chinese companies, institutes and provincial ministries.

Reference 5 - 0.32% Coverage

Activities ﬁnanced out of other budgets appear to include preferential (subsidised) export credits and incentives for Chinese companies to build overseas trade and economic cooperation zones. These ﬂows of funds largely parallel the ‘other ofﬁcial ﬂows’ category of the DAC,

Reference 6 - 0.24% Coverage

The Chinese government offers several different kinds   
of loan ﬁnance. Most of China’sofﬁcial ﬁnance is at competitive commercial rates similar to those charged by export credit agencies around the world.

Reference 7 - 0.20% Coverage

A smaller subset of Chinese ofﬁcial loans are subsidised. Of the subsidised funds, only   
some are considered ‘external assistance’; others are preferential export credits.

Reference 8 - 0.37% Coverage

As Zimmermann and Smith correctly note, China can provide packages that bundle together ﬁnance from several different government windows; some of it concessional and some of it market rate.5 Although these packages are uncommon, this practice is one reason why outsiders are confused over what is‘aid’ and what is business

Reference 9 - 0.35% Coverage

Neither of the examples laid out above would qualify as an ODA‐ﬁnanced activity, and yet, both of them are clearly ‘developmental’ and involve some ofﬁcial ﬁnancing, primarily   
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.   
J. Int. Dev. 23, 752–764 (2011) DOI: 10.1002/jid   
760 D. Bräutigam   
from the China Eximbank.

Reference 10 - 0.56% Coverage

Yet another major area of difference, of course, is in the application of conditionality.   
The members of the DAC are practised in banding together to impose economic and political conditions by using aid as part of the framework of carrots and sticks to coax and discipline recipients. As Zimmermann and Smith note, some DAC members fear that China and other non‐members are undermining DAC efforts to use aid conditionality to improve governance and human rights in developing countries.

Reference 11 - 0.19% Coverage

Another issue that should be clear by now is that the large lines of credit offered by   
Chinese policy banks are not provided as ODA but represent OOF, chieﬂy export credits.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 Mawdsley The changing geographies of foreign aid and develo - § 11 references coded [ 2.24% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.27% Coverage

The ﬁrst problem is that no single term can capture such a tremendous diversity of actors. Moreover, all of the terms currently deployed have problematic occlusions or associations. Thus, referring to such state actors as ‘emerging’, ‘non-traditional’ or ‘new’ donors ⁄ development actors obscures the fact that many have a long history of Third Worldist, socialist and ⁄or Islamic development partnerships, in some cases stretching back to the 1950s.

Reference 2 - 0.18% Coverage

Finally, in the speciﬁc case of the Southern states, a potentially attractive term is that of ‘postcolonial donors’. This nicely subverts dominant geographical imaginaries of who gives aid to whom, transgressing Orientalist binaries which set up the North as giver and the South as receiver (Six 2009).

Reference 3 - 0.24% Coverage

Some of the (re-)emerging actors prefer to call themselves ‘development partners’ in a conscious promotion of a discourse of horizontal relations of mutual beneﬁt, non-interference and respect for sovereignty, rather than the vertical hierarchy invoked by the terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’. Similarly, they often prefer the term ‘development assistance’ or ‘development cooperation’ to ‘foreign aid’.

Reference 4 - 0.19% Coverage

The dominantly Western membership of DAC has been one factor in encouraging most Western publics – and indeed, many policymakers, practitioners and academics – to understand foreign aid as something given exclusively by the richer, industrialised countries of the North to the poor, needy, backward countries of the South.

Reference 5 - 0.27% Coverage

In 2006, under the auspices of the Russian Presidency, the G8, the OECD and the World Bank held a conference on ‘Emerging Donors in the Global Development Community’; and in 2011 DFID announced a major policy shift in its intent to work with and in the ‘emerging powers’ (Mitchell 2011). For their part, some of the NDDs are keen to collaborate and move closer to the DAC community, including Turkey and Russia. Others are cautious about aligning with the ‘mainstream’.

Reference 6 - 0.39% Coverage

the assertion of a shared experience of colonial exploitation, postcolonial inequality and present vulnerability to uneven neoliberal globalisation, and thus a shared identity as ‘developing’ nations   
2 based on this shared experience, developing status, and some geographical commonalities (such as tropical ⁄monsoonal climates), a speciﬁc expertise in appropriate development approaches and technologies   
3 an explicit rejection of hierarchical relations, and a strong articulation of the principles of respect, sovereignty and non-interference and   
4 an insistence on win–win outcomes of South– South development cooperation and mutual opportunity.

Reference 7 - 0.18% Coverage

t. The ﬁrst is the assertion that the present world order is unjust and inequitable, and that under these circumstances, ‘globalisation currently presents more challenges and risks than opportunities to the vast number of developing countries’. ‘Developing countries’ must therefore act togethe

Reference 8 - 0.08% Coverage

The second element is the right to national selfdetermination, a rejection of the right of other countries to meddle in internal affairs

Reference 9 - 0.20% Coverage

China’s articulation of an alternative set of relations between sovereign states to those associated with colonial and postcolonial hegemonies and hierarchies between North and South. Speciﬁcally, the discourse of development cooperation is framed by claims to mutual beneﬁt and solidarity rather than charity and benevolence.

Reference 10 - 0.11% Coverage

Whereas the West deploys a symbolic regime of charity and benevolence to obscure this truism, the Southern donors invoke a rhetoric of solidarity, mutual beneﬁt and shared identities

Reference 11 - 0.15% Coverage

When China talks about ‘respect for sovereignty’, there is no acknowledgement that sovereign power may be contested from below, and that it by no means necessarily translates into an empowering relationship between a nation-state and its citizens.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 China as a net donor tracking dollars and sense - § 11 references coded [ 1.79% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

the Chinese assistance has been channelled mainly through bilateral channels, and framed by China-speciﬁc norms of international ‘solidarity’ with the developing, post-colonial world.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

Chinese government ofﬁcials have supported the implementation of the decision of the political elites by rearticulating how China’s aid is different from that of the ‘traditional donors’; arguing that it is more authentically rooted in motives of ‘South–South cooperation’ and ‘development partnership’ objectives.

Reference 3 - 0.28% Coverage

However, it is quite feasible that China has moved up to either number two or three on the list, providing about US$20–23 billion in 2010, if one uses a broader deﬁnition of ‘foreign aid’, which includes grants and no-interest development loans as well as the lines of concessional ﬁnancing that are issued under the rubric of ‘international economic cooperation’ lending by two state policy banks, China Export–Import Bank (China Eximbank) and China Development Bank (CDB).

Reference 4 - 0.14% Coverage

One of the biggest challenges in the study of the rising donors is knowing the   
exact amount of their respective aid contributions, when the dividing lines between aid, trade and investment are not clear, unlike the deﬁnition of ‘ODA’3

Reference 5 - 0.23% Coverage

The China Statistical Yearbook provides some yearly breakdowns for the aid budget that is managed by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), under ‘economic cooperation with foreign countries’, and this includes the categories of ‘value of business fulﬁlled’, ‘contracted value’, ‘number of contracts’ and types (labour services, design contracts, technology), and geography (regionally segmented).

Reference 6 - 0.08% Coverage

But these numbers grossly understate the totals, as they consist only of the grant contributions and interest-free loans managed by MOFCOM

Reference 7 - 0.08% Coverage

They do not include the sizeable low-interest ‘foreign economic cooperation’ loans that are administered by China Eximbank and CDB.

Reference 8 - 0.12% Coverage

Foreign aid ﬁgures are still ofﬁcially classiﬁed as a ‘state secret’. Chinese aid ofﬁcials also suggest that another reason for the lack of clear data is due to the lack of a centralized and uniﬁed tracking system

Reference 9 - 0.33% Coverage

Yet the importance of understanding the full range of China’s aid is reﬂected in the government’s own ‘White Paper on China’s foreign aid’ (Government of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Information Ofﬁce 2011), which classiﬁes the ‘ﬁnancial resources provided by China for foreign aid’ into three types—grants (aid gratis), interest-free loans and concessional loans—and states that the ﬁrst two come directly from China’s state ﬁnances, whereas concessional loans are provided by the Export–Import Bank of China, as designated by the Chinese government.

Reference 10 - 0.06% Coverage

This highly politicized aid is not included in the statistics of the Yearbook or the White Paper.

Reference 11 - 0.18% Coverage

Despite dramatic changes in China’s aid proﬁle, and in its world economic standing, the country’s ruling elites and state ofﬁcials have tried to maintain a status quo international identity: that China is a ‘developing country’, part of ‘the South’—and a different kind of aid provider from the Western donors

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Brant Chinese Aid in the South Pacific Linked to Resour - § 3 references coded [ 0.51% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

Chinese Government utilises a range of ﬁnancing mecha-   
nisms in its engagement with other developing countries. In addition, there is often a strong link between “aid” and “investment” projects, making accurate classiﬁcation of a project difﬁcult.

Reference 2 - 0.12% Coverage

The fact that the loan is taken out with the China Development Bank (CDB) provides further evidence that this is the case, as CDB does not provide concessional aid funding.

Reference 3 - 0.21% Coverage

The nexus between aid and investment and commercial and state interests that features quite prominently in Chinese development assistance   
presents an interesting challenge for traditional donors who (in theory at least) separate “aid” from other forms of engagement with developing countries.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Marian Urbina Social policy in the context of new global actors- How far is China’s developmental model in Africa impacting traditional donors~ - § 1 reference coded [ 0.17% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

Chinese policy supports the idea of non-   
conditionality in the provision of development aid, and is less concerned with promoting internal political changes and the advancement of democracy in recipient countries.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 The exceptional state in Africa Image management in Sino-African Relations - § 4 references coded [ 0.65% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

econd, China’s relations with Africa are said to be based on ‘mutual benefit’ which ‘breaks decidedly with the donor–recipient model of development dominant amongst OECD countries’

Reference 2 - 0.26% Coverage

According to this discourse, China has no plans to engage in colonial expansion. Furthermore, the   
Chinese will eschew Western practices of imposing their own ‘civilisation’, and be ‘selfless’ in their help for the weak – as epitomised by their aid programme, which allegedly comes with no political or economic conditions.

Reference 3 - 0.15% Coverage

ere, China’s identity as a great power is constructed by making use of a ‘Western Other’, where China’s morality is highlighted by emphasising its difference from the ‘immoral’ West.

Reference 4 - 0.10% Coverage

The only explicit difference is that China prefers to transfer its approach by example, rather than impose it like the West.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Varrall Chinese Views on China’s Role in International Dev - § 12 references coded [ 1.76% Coverage]

References 1-2 - 0.18% Coverage

China’s commitment to state-led development underpins its rhetoric of the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity in all international relations, and when it comes to China’s overseas development assistance, forms the basis of its "no-strings attached" approach.

Reference 3 - 0.16% Coverage

My interlocutors believed that China’s role in development should be as a partner with other developing countries, providing "SouthSouth cooperation" that complements but by no means replaces "North-South aid" as provided by "traditional" donors. A

Reference 4 - 0.23% Coverage

While the notion of South-South cooperation runs some risk of being interpreted as a smokescreen for the pursuit of Chinese geo-political and strategic interests, the South-South rhetoric, and how it is deployed in development discourse, represents China’s clear commitment to a developing country identity that has both domestic and international advantag

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

There is a strong feeling that Chinese aid had never and would never adopt what was seen as the Western approach of imposing particular social, political and economic norms onto others.

Reference 6 - 0.10% Coverage

ts, Chinese views of what development is, how it should be achieved, and particularly, by whom it should be implemented, are strongly coloured by national identit

Reference 7 - 0.14% Coverage

One crucial element of China’s national identity is the profoundly held belief that China has long been the victim of deliberate and coordinated efforts by foreign powers to prevent its re-emergence on the world stage.

Reference 8 - 0.25% Coverage

This sense of shared identity is based on China’s self-identification as a victim of Western imperialism. The very deliberately constructed remembrance of the past as one of "humiliation," as China refers to it, creates an imagined community of "Chineseness" based on a sense of exceptionalism and identity in opposition to putatively indistinguishable Western (and Japanese) imperial powers

Reference 9 - 0.10% Coverage

. As such, Chinese assistance is determined, rhetorically at least, to avoid the imperialistic, ideological and interfering tendencies of "traditional" donors.

Reference 10 - 0.15% Coverage

When understood in the context of Chinese history and identification as a victim of Western imperialism, these principles are a determined commitment   
to align China with other developing states, and to distinguish itself from the West.

Reference 11 - 0.18% Coverage

. Rather than using terminology such as "donor" and "recipient," China carefully frames engagement in the vocabulary of "mutual benefit" and "win-win cooperation," reflecting the wording of the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

Reference 12 - 0.16% Coverage

he commitment to providing overseas assistance "China’s way" is not just rhetoric. It reflects a deeply held sense of identity as a developing country whose national history was violently disrupted by Western imperialists, now regaining its rightful status

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Warmerdam Having, Giving, Taking Lessons on Ownership in Ch - § 2 references coded [ 0.26% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

However, Chinese project aid, especially projects ﬁnanced by concessional loans, requires that a proportion ofthe loan be used to acquire Chinese goods and services.

Reference 2 - 0.15% Coverage

Conditionalities are usually a result of donors wanting assurances that their money is well spent, especially as they have to justify expenditures to ministers, parliaments and to the general public in their own countries. C

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Foreign Aid and Development in Sino-African Relations - § 2 references coded [ 0.54% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

FOCAC has remained the most important indicator that China seeks serious, long-term and robust cooperation with Africa, by using the platform to cultivate solidarity and cooperation based on equality, consultation, consensus, friendship, partnership, and mutual benefit.

Reference 2 - 0.35% Coverage

while concessional loans are as designated by the Chinese government. Nevertheless, no matter the types of Chinese aid, it is official Chinese policy and it is deemed more mutually beneficial to disburse aid in eight forms that include complete projects, goods, and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical teams abroad, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries and debt relief, such that it will favor both China and the host country economically.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Kitano China’s Foreign Aid at a Transitional Stage - § 7 references coded [ 2.27% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

First, China’s “foreign aid” does not precisely match the deﬁnition of ODA given by DAC.1   
For example, China’s foreign   
aid does not include ﬂows through multilateral institutions

Reference 2 - 0.27% Coverage

China’s foreign aid also does not include scholarships for students from other developing countries. Second, other kinds of economic cooperation promoted by the overseas activities of Chinese enterprises have been supported by different kinds of ofﬁcial ﬁnancial measures.

Reference 3 - 0.49% Coverage

Strange et al. (2013) presented China’s aid data in Africa using a media-based approach to try to capture Ofﬁcial Development Finance (ODF).3   
It is meaningful to   
establish a comprehensive China aid database for Africa; however, this approach has limitations as media-based information is not always accurate and complete. For example, deﬁnitions of loans are vague, such as ODF-like or OOF-like loans. What we need is the volume of concessional loans and preferential export buyer’s credits to Africa.

Reference 4 - 0.37% Coverage

Based on these previous attempts by researchers, in this paper, I deﬁne China’s   
foreign aid as proxy for China’s bilateral ODA as a combination of grants and interestfree loans managed by the Ministry of Commerce and other relevant ministries, and the China Eximbank’s concessional loans as bilateral aid and central government expenditure for international organizations4

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

First, scholarships for overseas students from other developing countries was estimated and added to the aid expenditure.

Reference 6 - 0.50% Coverage

Second, interest subsidies for concessional loans were deducted from the aid expenditure based on Kobayashi and Shimomura (2013). Third, net disbursement of concessional loans was estimated. I also estimated net disbursement of preferential export buyer’s credits for reference based on the fact that, although the Chinese government does not recognize preferential export buyer’s credits as foreign aid, several developing countries categorize preferential export buyer’s credits as ODA loans.5

Reference 7 - 0.35% Coverage

China’s own experience as an aid recipient itself inﬂuenced the Chinese aid model that is characterized as delivering aid through aid–trade–investment package deals in pursuit of “self-reliance,” with high priority given to economic infrastructure; this approach was particularly inﬂuenced by the Japanese model of aid as it was practiced both in China9

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 The forum on China-Africa Cooperation,Ideas and Aid National Interest or Strategic Partnership - § 5 references coded [ 0.66% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

China has been reluctant to present itself as an ‘aid’ donor to the continent and sees itself as a developing country working with other developing countries, particularly African

Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage

First, China is committed to giving aid on the basis of equality and mutual   
benefit.

Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage

Second, China respects the sovereignty of recipient states and does not seek to impose conditionalities on aid (except for the one China policy).

Reference 4 - 0.12% Coverage

Third, economic aid is given with low or no interest rates coupled with flexible repayments to lessen the burden on aid receiving states.

Reference 5 - 0.18% Coverage

Fourth, aid should not be used as a tool to keep recipient countries dependent on China; instead, it should function as a means that will make these countries economically independent and self-reliant.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2015 Axel Dreher Rogue aid An empirical analysis of China’s aid allocation - § 2 references coded [ 0.14% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

However, when we compare its allocation to those ofother donors, China does not pay signiﬁcantly more attention to politics.

Reference 2 - 0.08% Coverage

Finally, China’s aid is, for the most part, independent ofthe recipients’ institutional characteristics, which seems to conﬁrm its non-interference principle.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Dennis D. Institutional Mismatch and Chinese in the Philippines Challenges and Opportunities - § 3 references coded [ 0.40% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

. South-South cooperation is more appealing to some developing-country governments because they are treated as equal partners instead of just receivers of assistance.

Reference 2 - 0.15% Coverage

Chinese aid is “a broad concept encompassing the value of overseas contracts, labor exports, consulting services, and nonfinancial foreign direct investment” (Foster, Butterfield, and Chen 2009, 9).

Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage

Concessional loans are sourced from the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China, which was established in 1994. It also conducts project assessments and receives loan repayments.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Marica Don China’s Coherence in International Eonomic Governance - § 1 reference coded [ 0.06% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

China does not condition its aid on ‘good governance’,orenvironmental standards as has been common in conventional aid.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Dreher et al. Aid, China, and Growth Evidence from a New Global - § 1 reference coded [ 0.11% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

A large proportion of the financial support that China provides to other countries comes in the form of export credits and market or close-to-market rate loans. Western donors and lenders, on the other hand, generally provide development finance on highly concessional terms and have less aggressive export credit programs.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Kishi Chinese Official Finance and State Repression in A - § 6 references coded [ 1.27% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

It is from this relationship we contend that unconditional   
finance increases the likelihood that states will engage in repression, rather than increasing the likelihood that non-state groups will challenge the state.

Reference 2 - 0.21% Coverage

While the ‘Washington consensus’ may be seen as “a neo-liberal paradigm that takes into consideration democracy, good governance, and poverty reduction,” (Fine and Jomo, 2005; Sautman and Hairong, 2007) the ‘Beijing consensus’ “values the political and international relations concept of multilateralism, consensus and peaceful co-existence” (Adisu et al., 2010:4).

Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage

Chinese emphasis on ‘South-South’ relations includes a ‘respect for sovereignty’, which is practiced as ‘non-interference’:   
“China is not imposing its political views, ideals nor principles onto recipient countries” (Davies et al., 2008:57

Reference 4 - 0.35% Coverage

The main difference between conditional and unconditional official finance is the lack of standard accountability mechanisms associated with the latter. New donors from emerging, nonDevelopment Assistance Committee (DAC) donors – for example, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) – “de-prioritise accountability principles focused on the rights of affected citizens, in favour of state-centric principles of non-interference and mutual benefit” (Macdonald and Miller-Dawkins, 2015a: 431; see also: Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele, 2011; Kragelund, 2011; Zimmermann and Smith, 2011; Quadir, 2013; Tilak, 2014).

Reference 5 - 0.11% Coverage

Across African states, the symbolic or economic burden of donor conditions or preconditions for accessing official finance are stated reasons why Chinese official finance is positively regarded

Reference 6 - 0.35% Coverage

In general, the ‘no strings attached model’ allows support of initiatives not attended to by the West, and limits reports, targets, and meetings that burden the overstretched capacities of many African states (Adisu et al., 2010:4; Sautman and Hairong, 2007; Brautigam, 2011a). Chinese official finance has brought significant and needed improvements including relatively high economic growth in Africa, debt cancellation, and needed infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, dams). China has also built health and educational capacity through student exchanges in universities and training centers (Adisu et al., 2010).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Li Does Conditionality Still Work China’s Developmen - § 2 references coded [ 0.45% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage

To get around the lack of aid data for individual countries, this article takes a different approach by constructing a measure based on expert opinions

Reference 2 - 0.33% Coverage

In the questionnaire, each respondent was asked to ﬁrst write down two African countries that, to the best of their knowledge, received the most and least amount of aid from China between 2001 and 2008. They were then asked to place each of the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa on a seven-point scale based on the amount of Chinese aid they had obtained in reference to those two other countrie

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Palina Prysmakova Chinese Intergovernmental Relations and World Development - § 6 references coded [ 1.35% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.25% Coverage

. However, in comparison to the regulations of export credit agencies in OECD countries, the export finance systems of developing countries have almost no restrictions. In the case of China, it also has “exponentially deeper pockets” (Cotter, 2012): in aggregate, the Chinese export credit programs are estimated to total over US$100 billion a year (ExIm US, 2011).

Reference 2 - 0.25% Coverage

irst, “going global” policy offers the support to Chinese companies in undertaking overseas activities through providing interest rate subsidies for commercial bank loans (Bräutigam, 2010). Second, Chinese export credit agencies pursue a “going out” policy as a central means to establish long-term relationships with foreign governments (ExIm US, 2011).

Reference 3 - 0.17% Coverage

This article applies the terms “development assis-   
tance,”“foreign aid,” and “export credits” for China interchangeably, arguing that the border between the official development assistance (ODA) and the Chinese financial assistance is very thin

Reference 4 - 0.23% Coverage

First, the Chinese export credits represent official assistance, because it comes from the Chinese government. Second, Chinese export credits indeed promote “welfare and economic development in the recipient country,” because these credits allow transfers of concessional resources that address poor infrastructure.

Reference 5 - 0.14% Coverage

Chinese export credits exemplify the only international assistance that Belarus currently receives with no conditionality imposed on the regime or requirements for administrative reforms. T

Reference 6 - 0.31% Coverage

Thus, while the Chinese crediting institutions do not pay attention to the political regimes of the recipient countries, they can be very strict as for the incumbent mandatory purchase of Chinese products or services and their requirement to be responsible for it through all the stages (Pál, 2013). Moreover, the Chinese could take advantage of being the sole creditor of a developing country and, therefore, boost the prices of goods and services

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Tracking Under-Reported Financial Flows China’s development finance and the aid-conflict nexus revisited - § 7 references coded [ 1.01% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

the absence of reliable and comprehensive data about Chinese development finance, much of the conventional wisdom about Chinese development finance rests on untested assumptions, individual case studies, and incomplete data sources.6

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

The White Paper does not explicitly address how China classifies different development finance flow types and classes

Reference 3 - 0.08% Coverage

What is more, there is no consensus as to how to classify many Chinese financial instruments that lack OECD-DAC counterparts such as natural resource-backed loans.

Reference 4 - 0.20% Coverage

So-called Chinese “package financing” means that development finance often consists of agreements that mix aid and investment, and/or concessional and non-concessional financing (Grimm et al. 2011). Chinese state-owned enterprises also blur the line between official government finance and private flows; FDI or joint ventures can come from firms that are either private or state-owned.

Reference 5 - 0.24% Coverage

there may be substantial discrepancies between Western and Chinese considerations of the cost of aid for the donor country. Western aid budgets include administrative costs which might inflate statistics on aid 9 The OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts is available online at http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacglossary.htm.   
6   
flows since substantial chunks of aid budgets might be used on donor administrative costs rather than directly on recipient development

Reference 6 - 0.11% Coverage

The difficulties to align Chinese development finance with DAC categories are further complicated by the fact that many transactions with African countries are in fact bundles of several financing mechanisms.

Reference 7 - 0.20% Coverage

Bräutigam (2009, 2011) demonstrates that many forms of Chinese development finance do not fit cleanly into OECD-DAC categorizations. However, neither the research community nor the policy community has coalesced around a single taxonomy for classifying and categorizing Chinese development finance flows that enables some degree of comparison with development finance flows from OECD-DAC donors.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Euri Lee The Belt and Road Initative Impact on Trade Patterns between China and Central Asia - § 12 references coded [ 4.70% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.32% Coverage

The empirical results using panel data show that a 1% increase in bilateral official development flows (ODF) of China specific to five Central Asian countries leads to a 0.238% increase in Chinese bilateral trade volume with these recipient countrie

Reference 2 - 0.31% Coverage

Moreover, the impact of Chinese bilateral ODF (0.046%) is larger than the impact of the OECD’s average ODF (0.0077%) and Chinese bilateral ODF specific to five Central Asian countries have an even larger than average Chinese ODF impact (0.238%).

Reference 3 - 0.45% Coverage

This greater degree of impact of Chinese ODF is related to geographical proximity and to improvements in infrastructure connectivity. Recent trade increases between China and Central Asian countries are attributed to the recent construction of oil and gas pipelines under the BRI scheme and a rise in the export of Chinese manufacturing products.

Reference 4 - 0.32% Coverage

In midst of recent dwindling Chinese economic situation, Chinese president Xi initiated a massive infrastructural investment plan in 2013 for expanding connectivity between China and old Silk Road countries to boost neighbors’ and its economy.

Reference 5 - 0.22% Coverage

The initiative includes over 65 nations in which Chinese government invest in infrastructure to improve connectivity for both land and maritime ways from the East to the West.

Reference 6 - 0.16% Coverage

Central Asia, its economy is limited by being landlocked, marks a case in point for presenting remarkable benefits of BRI.

Reference 7 - 0.39% Coverage

Chinese foreign aid especially focused on connective financing, such as infrastructure for shipments, roads and railways, are indeed helping developing countries to have a stepping stone for not only steady growth but also an opportunity to reduce inequality within the country (Bluhm et al. 2018).

Reference 8 - 0.42% Coverage

The recent characteristics of Chinese BRI investment since 2013 present both concessional as well as non‑concessional flows to recipient countries. However, loans and direct investments are the most popular choice of investing in BRI recipient countries, especially loans with conditions tied provided by Chinese banks.

Reference 9 - 0.52% Coverage

Belt and Road Initiative is Chinese led infrastructure investment project promoting regional economic cooperation and market integration by connecting China to three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—along the five routes. In the backdrop of China’s recent slowdown in its growth, China plans to expand its international influence and its exporting market while boosting its domestic economy.

Reference 10 - 0.51% Coverage

The major funding sources for BRI are four big state owned commercial banks in China (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China), China Development Bank (CDB), and EXIM bank of China ($150, $110 and $24 billion US, respectively, while the total amount of investment is $292 billion US according to financial times and The Guardian 2018).

Reference 11 - 0.77% Coverage

in the analysis of bilateral trade between China and 5 Central Asian countries, the impact of Chinese ODF was considerably larger than both OECD average and Chinese ODF. This implies the Chinese ODF have vital impact on Central Asia’s trade pattern. Such gap in the impact of ODF can be contributed to number of factors: first, China’s ODF focus on building infrastructure particularly focused on natural resource extraction and exporting sector in Central Asia such as oil and gas pipelines to China (Asian Development Bank Institute 2014), whereas the Western ODF is more scattered on various sectors.

Reference 12 - 0.32% Coverage

Thus, such impact of Chinese ODF in Central Asia, which is constrained by being in landlocked and strong dependence on Russia, is benefiting from the Chinese ODF and expected to see higher growth due to potential surge of Chinese ODF under the plans of BRI.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Kassaye Deyassa Does China’s Aid in Africa Affect Traditional Donors - § 1 reference coded [ 0.84% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.84% Coverage

It is striking that Chinese development aid policy is currently somewhat different from the political discourse of traditional Western donors in moving toward an expanded role for targeted, redistributive social spending for the poor. It is important not to overestimate the discrepancy as the Chinese approach to social development is not static, and China’s ideas and practices are changing and evolving. It is undoubtedly true that China is increasingly attaching more importance development elements, such as capacity building, both domestically and internationally. Similarly, there is some evidence of the possibility that China’s norms are changing as a result of increased interaction with Western institutions (e.g., China has sent delegates as observers to the DAC meetings) and therefore, some convergence in the future.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Pippa Morgan Ideology and Relationality Chinese Aid in Africa - § 1 reference coded [ 0.21% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.21% Coverage

Nevertheless, many of these concerns falsely conflate the behavior of commercial, often private, investors rather than government aid,21 and after taking office in 2011, Sata signif-   
Pippa Morgan 231   
icantly toned down his anti-China rhetoric, even visiting China in an attempt to secure more aid

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Kinyondo Is China Recolonizing Africa Some Views from Tanz - § 1 reference coded [ 0.10% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

Ideologyinformed cooperation was believed to be superior to its alternatives because it was based on the idea that it would be equally beneficial for all the cooperating partners.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Pippa Morgan Can China’s Economic Statecraft Win Soft Power in Africa - § 1 reference coded [ 0.09% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.09% Coverage

President Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the latest and largest manifestation of modern China’s economic statecraf

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Pippa Morgan Old bottle new wine The evolution of China’s aid in Africa from 1965-2014 - § 4 references coded [ 1.19% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.22% Coverage

However, due to lack of comprehensive project level cross-national data on China’s his-   
torical aid, it has thus far been extremely difficult to draw quantitative conclusions about the characteristics and historical evolution of China’s aid across the whole African continent.

Reference 2 - 0.13% Coverage

Unlike DAC donors, China does not report official disaggregated data, and Chinese Government White Papers16 and other official statistics offer only aggregate figures.

Reference 3 - 0.55% Coverage

foreign treaties listed on Peking University’s PKU law database,22 a Chinese language database of Chinese laws and treaties. Relevant documents mainly included Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreements, in which China agrees to provide grants, loans, technical or other assistance to recipients, and Protocols on Chinese Medical Teams, in which China commits to dispatch teams of doctors with supporting staff and medicines. These treaties are reliable, official sources; however, the database is not a complete record of all agreements between China and recipients, and the treaties frequently lack specific details and may contain information about projects which were committed but not executed.

Reference 4 - 0.30% Coverage

With traditional OECD funding, as well as multilateral funding from bodies such as the World Bank, concentrated in ODA-like projects which tend to focus on capacity building and social sectors, China is filling this space with a mix of traditional ODA-like aid and commercial or near-commercial types of finance, and with other types of support such as construction of industrial zones.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Sears What Counts as Foreign Aid Dilemmas and Ways Forw - § 19 references coded [ 5.04% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

One Belt, One Road is the latest indicator of China’s role as a source of finance for development and foreign aid.

Reference 2 - 0.26% Coverage

Chinese officials, according to Western sources, view the project as a way to usher in a “new era of globalization” (Ruwitch and Blanchard 2017)as well as a geopolitical strategy to win nations to the   
side of the putative next leader of the global economy.

Reference 3 - 0.22% Coverage

Although China does not outright reject this widely used definition of aid, the country’s definition, which it applies to self-reported data, is not aligned with it (Glosny 2006; Office of the State Council 2014).

Reference 4 - 0.11% Coverage

Scholars have attempted to reconcile non-DAC definitions of ODA by developing proxies for the DAC definition.

Reference 5 - 0.16% Coverage

To date, there are no studies that offer a systematic comparison and analysis of the different definitions offered by scholars and a nonDAC government.

Reference 6 - 0.14% Coverage

This gap hampers studies of Chinese bilateral aid because dependence on one proxy over another could introduce bias into the results.

Reference 7 - 0.37% Coverage

Incomplete and miscategorized data introduce severe empirical limitations to the study of China’s disbursement of development assistance in comparison to traditional donors such as the United States and United Kingdom, as well as the frequent misrepresentation of aid flows reported by both supporters and skeptics of China’s role in Global South development.

Reference 8 - 0.23% Coverage

In the case of China, which has been disbursing aid to the African continent since the 1950s, the impetus to measure Chinese aid disbursements accurately is more critical today due to the country’s rapidly growing role as a donor

Reference 9 - 0.67% Coverage

Chinese assistance and financial flows are often difficult to quantify and compare with DAC data for three principal reasons. First, as noted, the country is not a member of the OECD DAC (Strange et al. 2015) and thus is exempt from categorizing and operating under international development standards shared by OECD members. Second, China has opted out of other major nongovernmental standards initiatives, most notably the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). Third, although China has signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, the country is signed on as both a donor and a recipient (Granath 2016).

Reference 10 - 0.29% Coverage

The result of these institutional exclusions and (mis)categorizations is that China operates with reporting categories and norms that are neither shared with Global North donors nor standardized, inhibiting comparison and thus knowledge of a quickly changing aid landscape.

Reference 11 - 0.33% Coverage

China offers Global South aid recipients a “package-financing mode,” for example, that combines export buyer’s and seller’s credits and concessional loans for, but not limited to, targeted projects (Br€autigam 2012). Whereas ODA donors would exclude credits, the Chinese government counts the entire package as aid.

Reference 12 - 0.15% Coverage

Thus, if compared to DAC donors using the DAC definitions, China’s ODA would be significantly smaller than the self-reported figures in this case.

Reference 13 - 0.17% Coverage

China considers grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans to be foreign assistance in its key White Paper on Foreign Aid (Office of the State Council 2014).

Reference 14 - 0.28% Coverage

One principal finding from this analysis is that the most inclusive definitions do not necessarily compute to the largest aid total year to year. The slight differences in counting certain flows as aid produce a more nuanced picture of development assistance from China.

Reference 15 - 0.39% Coverage

Interestingly, China’s White Paper has a lower estimate of Chinese aid than the OECD in 2011. Also of note is that although Strange et al. claimed to model their aid definitions after the OECD definition, their definition ranks number   
4.9 5   
Measuring China’s Overseas Development Flows   
two (second least restrictive) on the scale, whereas the OECD ranks fifth as most restrictive.

Reference 16 - 0.40% Coverage

One issue that emerges from this analysis is that   
aid data and reporting according to the DAC definition focus on monetary forms of aid such as grants and loans. Many Global South countries give aid-inkind and other forms of nonmonetary aid. The implication of using the ODA definition over proxies developed for Global South donors is that a significant proportion of in-kind aid is not counted. F

Reference 17 - 0.32% Coverage

Such medical assistance, which would be counted as aid if Br€autigam’s terms were applied to Cuba, is often not recognized by Western standards not only because it is not monetary aid but also because it comes from a Global South donor and thus is not reported in ways that are legible to the dominant donor bureaucracy

Reference 18 - 0.28% Coverage

In the case of China, which undertakes significant in-kind forms of aid, the inability to recognize and count those forms further underrepresents Chinese aid and perhaps also occludes a different development philosophy from Western donors (Ramo 2004; Williamson 2012).

Reference 19 - 0.16% Coverage

As Sidaway and Woon (2017) pointed out, the One Belt, One Road Initiative revives the Silk Road and can thus be read as an appropriation of European imperialism.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Seven decades of Chinese state financingin Africa - § 11 references coded [ 1.80% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.25% Coverage

While exact loan terms are diﬃcult to ﬁnd for many historical (and contemporary) projects, Chinese government loans to developing countries were primarily interest-free before the 1990s. In contrast, today China’s government provides a mix of interest-free, concessional, and market-based loans, only some of which qualify as ‘aid’ in the traditional sense.

Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage

China’s evolving position in the international system has shaped its identity as   
an aid donor.

Reference 3 - 0.12% Coverage

However, a survey of earlier academic research reveals a long tradition of painstaking eﬀorts by researchers to develop project-level data on Chinese development ﬁnance.

Reference 4 - 0.10% Coverage

Building on these earlier studies, researchers have also created analogous project-level   
data on contemporary Chinese state ﬁnancing.

Reference 5 - 0.08% Coverage

Lacking oﬃcial data, earlier eﬀorts encountered empirical challenges similar to those faced by researchers today.

Reference 6 - 0.19% Coverage

Nonetheless, these data collectively help reveal temporal shifts in the strategic, geographic and sectoral priorities of the Chinese government’s engagement with Africa, as well as changes in how China’sgovernment ﬁnances development projects in African countries.

Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage

Compared to traditional grant-like ﬁnancing, concessional loans were more ﬂexible in   
terms of the types of projects they supported, sources of government agency ﬁnancing, and choice of recipient destinations (Zhu 1997).

Reference 8 - 0.27% Coverage

This ﬂexibility embodied China’s preference for development ﬁnance that beneﬁted both the donor and recipient, since projects promised to provide growth opportunities for recipient countries as well as international market opportunities for Chinese ﬁrms. In order to facilitate its concessional loan programme, in 1994 China’s government established China Eximbank (Fuchs and Rudyak 2017).

Reference 9 - 0.29% Coverage

As a result, it is increasingly important for both policymakers and researchers to distinguish between diﬀerent types of Chinese state ﬁnancing to African countries, particularly in terms of whether project ﬁnancing is highly concessional and development-oriented, and thus resembles ODA deﬁned by OECD-DAC standards, or is relatively commercial and does not qualify as ‘aid’ in the traditional sense (Dreher et al. 2018).

Reference 10 - 0.14% Coverage

state ﬁnancing is only one element of China’s presence in African countries,   
and should not be extrapolated to make broader arguments about ‘China in Africa’ or Sino–African relations more generally

Reference 11 - 0.14% Coverage

Conﬂating government ﬁnancing with these broader frameworks would grossly neglect non-state commercial and human ties that help form the broader relationship, both in Africa as well as within China.